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Extensions of the Simpson voting rule
to the committee selection setting
Daniela Bubboloni∗ Mostapha Diss† Michele Gori‡
Abstract
Committee selection rules are procedures selecting sets of candidates (committees) of a given size
on the basis of the preferences of the voters. There are in the literature two natural extensions
of the well-known single-winner Simpson voting rule to the multiwinner setting. We propose an
in-depth analysis of those committee selection rules, assessing and comparing them with respect
to several desirable properties among which unanimity, fixed majority, non-imposition, stability,
local stability, Condorcet consistency, some kinds of monotonicity, resolvability and consensus
committee. We also investigate the probability that the two methods are resolute and suffer
the reversal bias, the Condorcet loser paradox and the leaving member paradox. We compare
the results obtained with the ones related to further well-known committee selection rules. The
probability assumption on which our results are based is the widely used Impartial Anonymous
Culture.
Keywords: Multiwinner Elections, Committee Selection Rule, Simpson Voting Rule, Para-
doxes, Probability.
JEL Classification Numbers: D71, D72
1 Introduction
A voting rule is a procedure for associating with any preference profile, that is a collection of individual
preferences expressed as linear orders on a set of candidates, one of the candidates to be interpreted
as the winner of the election. There are many situations where instead of choosing a single winner
a society is required to select a given number of candidates from the set of available options. This
may begin with the choice of representatives in an elementary school class to the choice of national
legislators or international representatives of a country (e.g., in the European Parliament). This
motivates the introduction of the concept of committee selection rule (csr), namely a procedure
which associates with any preference profile and any positive integer k a subset of candidates of size
k. There are many csrs studied in the literature based on different ideas and principles. Most of
them are extensions of well-known voting rules to the multiwinner setting, that is, they reduce to
those voting rules when k = 1.
According to this approach, Barberà and Coelho (2008) take into consideration an extension of
the Simpson voting rule,1 called here the Simpson csr and denoted by S. Recall that, given a
preference profile, the Simpson voting rule first associates with any candidate x the number of voters
preferring x to y for every other candidate y. The minimum of these quantities is called the Simpson
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score of x. Next, a candidate is selected if she has the highest Simpson score. If now k is the target
size of the committee to be elected, a set W of candidates of size k is selected by S if the Simpson
score of each candidate in W is at least as great as the one of each nonmember of W . Barberà and
Coelho (2008) show that, even though the Simpson voting rule is Condorcet consistent, S is not
stable, that is, it may fail to select weak Condorcet committees. Recall that a subset of candidates is
called a weak Condorcet committee if no candidate in this subset can be defeated by any candidate
from outside the subset on the basis of pairwise majority comparisons.2 We further notice that S
presents much more severe distortions. Assume, for instance, that only three candidates x, y and z
are considered and that each voter has preferences given by x  y  z. If we focus on committees
having size k = 2, S selects the two sets {x, y} and {x, z}, violating a very natural unanimity
principle which should admit {x, y} as the unique selected set.
Coelho (2004) proposes another possible extension of the Simpson voting rule to the committee
selection setting, called the Minimal Size of External Opposition csr and here denoted by M. Given
a preference profile, the method associates with any nonempty set W a score, called the Maximin
score of W , computed as follows: for every x in W and y not in W the number of voters preferring x
to y is considered and then the minimum of these numbers is taken. Once the size k of the committee
is fixed, M selects the sets of candidates which obtain the greatest Maximin score among the ones of
size k. The main difference between the two extensions lies in the fact that S determines its outcome
on the basis of a ranking of candidates while the outcome of M is directly obtained by means of
a ranking of committees of the same size. It can be proved that, differently from S, M is stable.
Moreover, M selects the subset {x, y} as the unique winning committee in the above considered
example. This depends on the fact that the Maximin score of {x, y} equals the total number of
voters, while the Maximin score of the other two possible subsets of size two is zero.
The first contribution of this paper is an in-depth analysis of the properties of the two csr S and
M. We mainly rely on the papers of Kamwa (2017a,b) as well as the paper of Elkind et al. (2017).
In Kamwa (2017a) some of the properties considered in our paper are already studied for M and
other stable csrs which can be considered as possible extensions of well-known voting rules to the
committee selection setting. That paper is extended by Kamwa (2017b) who compares the considered
csrs when there are three candidates and the size of the committee to be elected is two on the basis
of what the author calls the ‘divergence on outcomes’ defined as the situation where a committee
selected by a csr differs from the committee made by the best candidates of the corresponding
voting rule from which the csr is adapted. Elkind et al. (2017) represents a preliminary attempt to
develop a formal framework for the study of the characteristics of csrs when the voters’ preferences
are linear orders, where several properties are introduced and discussed. We take into account all the
properties considered by Kamwa (2017a,b) and Elkind et al. (2017) and, in addition, we formulate
further desirable properties against which the two csrs S and M are judged. Table 1 provides a
summary of our results. It is worth noting that two families of csrs were introduced by Elkind et
al. (2017, Section 3.2) to describe many classic csrs in a unified framework: the best-k rules and the
committee scoring rules. It can be easily seen that S is a best-k rule, while it is not a committee
scoring rule (Proposition 13). Even though those families surely cover a lot of interesting csrs, there
is room for other kinds of rules based on a quite different approach and which do not fall into one
of those categories. Indeed, M is neither a best-k rule nor a committee scoring rule (Propositions 7
and 13).
In the course of our investigations, we also observe that both S and M fail to be resolute and
suffer the reversal bias, the Condorcet loser and the leaving member paradoxes. We compute then
the probability of these particular situations and we compare the results with those obtained for
the Borda, the Plurality, the Negative Plurality and the Bloc csrs. The probability assumption on
which our results are based is the widely used Impartial Anonymous Culture (IAC). We are also
concerned about the probability that S and M select the same unique committee as well as the
probability that each of them and the Borda csr select the same unique committee. This identifies
the second contribution of this paper. Our results show distinct performances of the csrs according
2Obviously, this concept is a generalization to the committee selection setting of the well-known concept of weak
Condorcet winner.
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to the number of candidates, the number of voters and the target size of the committee. In many
cases, M does not have the highest level of performance, but in general it behaves better than S.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 is devoted to basic notation and definitions. Section
3 presents our results about the properties of S and M. Section 4 presents the computational
probabilistic analysis related to S and M and the other considered csrs. Finally, the appendix
contains some further properties about S and M which are mainly instrumental for the arguments
developed in Section 4.
2 Definitions and notation
Let N be the set of positive integers and set N0 = N ∪ {0}. Let k ∈ N and X be a finite set. We
denote by [k] the set {1, . . . , k} and by |X| the size of X. Moreover, we denote by 2Xk the set of the
subsets of X of size k. If |X| = m ≥ 1, we denote by L(X) the set of linear orders on X. Given
q ∈ L(X), we represent q by an expression of the type x1 q x2 q . . . q xm (the subscript q is
generally omitted) or by a column vector [x1, . . . , xm]
T , where x1, . . . , xm are the distinct elements of
X. We define qr as the element in L(X) such that, for every x, y ∈ X, x q y if and only if y qr x.
Let Sym(X) be the set of bijective functions from X to X. For every ψ ∈ Sym(X), we also define
ψq as the element of L(X) such that, for every x, y ∈ X, x q y if and only if ψ(x) ψq ψ(y). Thus,
if q = [x1, . . . , xm]
T , then qr = [xm, . . . , x1]
T and ψq = [ψ(x1), . . . , ψ(xm)]
T .
Consider a countably infinite set C whose elements are to be interpreted as potential candidates
and a countably infinite set V whose elements are to be interpreted as potential voters. For simplicity,
we identify C and V with N. An election is a vector (C, V, p), where C is a finite subset of C having
at least two elements, V is a nonempty and finite subset of V , and p is a function from V to L(C),
the set of linear orders on C. Given an election (C, V, p), p(v) is interpreted as the preference relation
of voter v on the set of candidates C. For x, y ∈ C with x 6= y, x p(v) y means that x is strictly
preferred to y in p(v). The function p is called the preference profile of the election. When V = [n],
p can be represented by a matrix whose v-th column is p(v) for all v ∈ V . Each W ⊆ C with
|W | ∈ [1, |C| − 1] is called committee, so that 2Ck is the set of committees of size k.
The set of elections is denoted by E . A committee selection rule (csr) R is a function which
associates with every (C, V, p) ∈ E and k ∈ [|C| − 1] a nonempty subset of 2Ck .
Let (C, V, p) ∈ E . For every x, y ∈ C with x 6= y, we set
cp(x, y) = |{v ∈ V : x p(v) y}|.
Given x ∈ C, the Simpson score of x is defined by
S(C, V, p, x) = min
y 6=x
cp(x, y).
Following Barberà and Coelho (2008), the Simpson csr S is defined, for every (C, V, p) ∈ E and
k ∈ [|C| − 1], by
S(C, V, p, k) =
{
W ∈ 2Ck : ∀x ∈W, ∀y 6∈W, S(C, V, p, x) ≥ S(C, V, p, y)
}
.
The Simpson csr restricted to the case k = 1 agrees, by definition, with the classical Simpson
voting rule. Note that, according to Elkind et al. (2017, Definition 1), the Simpson csr is the best-k
rule associated with the social preference function naturally induced by the Simpson score. That
observation allows to obtain some properties for S as an application of general results about best-k
rules proved by Elkind et al. (2017).
Coelho (2004) proposes another csr which agrees with the Simpson voting rule when k = 1. Here
we introduce it via an equivalent definition. Given (C, V, p) ∈ E and W ⊆ C with |W | ∈ [|C| − 1],
the Maximin score of W is defined by




The Minimal Size of External Opposition csr M is defined, for every (C, V, p) ∈ E and k ∈ [|C| − 1],
by3
M(C, V, p, k) = arg max
W∈2Ck
M(C, V, p,W ).
We stress that, even though S and M agree when k = 1, that is not true in general for other
values of k. For instance, considering (C, V, p) ∈ E with C = [3], V = [3] and
p =
 1 1 32 2 1
3 3 2
 ,
we have that M(C, V, p, 2) = {{1, 2}} and S(C, V, p, 2) = {{1, 3}}.
In what follows, when the set of candidates C and the set of voters V are clear, we usually omit
those symbols. For instance, the expression S(C, V, p, x) simply becomes S(p, x).
3 An analysis of the Simpson and the Maximin csrs
Anonymity, neutrality and homogeneity are well-known properties a csr may meet. Anonymity and
neutrality refer to the fact that respectively voters and candidates names are immaterial. Homo-
geneity means that replicating the preferences of each voter has no impact on the final outcome.
A csr R is anonymous if, for every (C, V, p) ∈ E , k ∈ [|C| − 1] and ϕ ∈ Sym(V ), R(C, V, p, k) =
R(C, V, pϕ, k), where pϕ(v) = p(ϕ−1(v)) for all v ∈ V ; R is neutral if, for every (C, V, p) ∈ E ,
k ∈ [|C| − 1] and ψ ∈ Sym(C), R(C, V, ψp, k) = {ψ(W ) ∈ 2Ck : W ∈ R(C, V, p, k)}, where (ψp)(v) =
ψ(p(v)) for all v ∈ V . Given now (C, V1, p1), (C, V2, p2) ∈ E with V1 ∩ V2 = ∅, we denote by p1 + p2
the preference profile such that, for every v ∈ V1, (p1 + p1)(v) = p1(v) and, for every v ∈ V2,
(p1 + p2)(v) = p2(v). Thus, (C, V1 ∪ V2, p1 + p2) is an element of E . R is homogeneous if, for every
(C, V1, p1), (C, V2, p2) ∈ E such that V1∩V2 = ∅ and k ∈ [|C|−1], we have R(C, V1∪V2, p1 +p2, k) =
R(C, V1, p1, k), provided that there exists a bijective function σ : V1 → V2 such that for every v ∈ V1,
p1(v) = p2(σ(v)).
The proof of the following result is straightforward and thus omitted.
Proposition 1. S and M are anonymous, neutral and homogeneous.
3.1 Stability and related weaker properties
In this section we deal with some properties which can be bundled together as majority kind prop-
erties. They are focused on different levels of respect of the classic Condorcet principle in electing
committees.
Let (C, V, p) ∈ E and W ⊆ C with |W | ∈ [1, |C| − 1]. Following Gehrlein (1985), we say that W





Following Kamwa (2017a), we say that W is a weak Condorcet committee if, for every x ∈ W and





Clearly W is a Condorcet committee if and only if M(C, V, p,W ) > |V |2 ; W is a weak Condorcet
committee if and only if M(C, V, p,W ) ≥ |V |2 ; if W is a Condorcet committee, then it is a weak
3In Coelho (2004) M is denoted by SEO and it is defined as







Condorcet committee. Moreover, it can be easily checked that if a Condorcet committee of size k
exists, then it is unique of that size. On the other hand, it is possible to have more than one weak
Condorcet committee of the same size.
A csr R is called stable if, for every (C, V, p) ∈ E and k ∈ [|C| − 1] such that there exists a
weak Condorcet committee of size k for (C, V, p), we have that every W ∈ R(C, V, p, k) is a weak
Condorcet committee;4 R is Condorcet consistent if, for every (C, V, p) ∈ E and k ∈ [|C|−1] such that
there exists a Condorcet committee W of size k for (C, V, p), we have that R(C, V, p, k) = {W};5 R
satisfies fixed majority (resp. strong unanimity) if, for every (C, V, p) ∈ E , k ∈ [|C| − 1] and W ∈ 2Ck
such that a strict majority of the voters (resp. all the voters) rank all the members of W above all
the non-members of W , we have that R(C, V, p, k) = {W};6 R satisfies weak unanimity if, for every
(C, V, p) ∈ E , k ∈ [|C| − 1] and W ∈ 2Ck such that all the voters rank all the members of W above
all the non-members of W , we have that W ∈ R(C, V, p, k);6 R satisfies strong non-imposition if, for
every C ⊆ C and V ⊆ V finite sets with |C| ≥ 2, |V | ≥ 1, k ∈ [|C| − 1] and W ∈ 2Ck , there exists
(C, V, p) ∈ E such that R(C, V, p, k) = {W}; R satisfies non-imposition if, for every finite set C ⊆ C
with |C| ≥ 2, k ∈ [|C| − 1] and W ∈ 2Ck , there exists (C, V, p) ∈ E such that R(C, V, p, k) = {W}.6 It
can be easily proved that if R is stable, then it is Condorcet consistent. Indeed, if W is a Condorcet
committee of size k for (C, V, p) ∈ E , then the set of the weak Condorcet committees of size k for
(C, V, p) is {W}. Then the following chain of implications holds true:
Stability⇒ Condorcet Consistency⇒ Fixed Majority⇒ Strong Unanimity⇒Weak Unanimity
(1)
Note also that strong unanimity implies strong non-imposition.
The next proposition shows not only that S fails stability, as shown by Barberà and Coelho
(2008, Proposition 3), but that it even fails strong unanimity. On the contrary, M is stable. This is
a crucial difference between the two csrs.
Proposition 2. S is not strongly unanimous. In particular, S does not satisfy fixed majority, is
not Condorcet consistent and is not stable.
Proof. Consider (C, V, p) with C = {1, 2, 3} and 1 p(v) 2 p(v) 3 for all v ∈ V and k = 2. The
strong unanimity principle implies that {1, 2} is the only selected committee. However, S(p, 1) = |V |,
S(p, 2) = 0, S(p, 3) = 0 so that S(p, 2) = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}}.
Proposition 3. S is weakly unanimous, satisfies non-imposition and does not satisfy strong non-
imposition.
Proof. Let (C, V, p) ∈ E and k ∈ [|C| − 1]. Assume that W ∈ 2Ck is such that all the voters rank all
the members of W above all the non-members of W . We want to show that W ∈ S(p, k), that is, for
every x ∈W and every y ∈ C \W , we have S(p, x) ≥ S(p, y). Fix then x ∈W and y ∈ C \W . Then
S(p, y) = min
z 6=y
cp(y, z) ≤ cp(y, x) = 0.
Thus, trivially, S(p, x) ≥ S(p, y) = 0. This shows that S is weakly unanimous.
In order to show non-imposition, let C be a finite set with |C| = m ≥ 2, k ∈ [|C| − 1] and
W ∗ ∈ 2Ck . Let W ∗ = {x1, . . . , xk} and C \W ∗ = {yk+1, . . . , ym}. If k = 1, consider just a single voter
having x1 ranked first. Assume next that k ≥ 2. In this case, consider the election (C, [2], p), where
x1 p1 x2 p1 . . . p1 xk p1 yk+1 p1 . . . p1 ym
and
xk p2 xk−1 p2 . . . p2 x1 p2 yk+1 p2 . . . p2 ym.
Then we have S(p, xi) = 1 for all i ∈ [k], and S(p, yi) = 0 for all i ∈ {k + 1, . . . ,m}. Thus S(p, k) =
{W ∗}.
4Barberà and Coelho (2008, Definition 3).
5Gehrlein (1985).
6Elkind et al. (2017).
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Finally note that S does not satisfy strong non-imposition because the selection of two alternatives
when a single voter is considered never leads to a unique outcome.
The next proposition shows, among other things, that M is stable. We note that Coelho (2004)
just introduces M as an example of stable csr.
Proposition 4. M is stable. In particular, M is Condorcet consistent, satisfies fixed majority,
strong unanimity, weak unanimity and strong non-imposition.
Proof. Let (C, V, p) ∈ E and k ∈ [|C| − 1] be such that there exists a weak Condorcet committee of
size k, say W ∗. We know that, M(p,W ∗) ≥ |V |2 . Let now W ∈M(p, k) and prove that W is a weak
Condorcet committee. Indeed, assume by contradiction that W is not a weak Condorcet committee.
Then M(p,W ) < |V |2 , so that M(p,W ) < M(p,W
∗) and W 6∈M(p, k), a contradiction.
Since M is stable, applying the chain of implications (1), all the remaining facts are immediately
established.
3.2 Monotonicity properties
In this section we deal with monotonicity properties, that is those properties assuring, within the
same election, a sensible link between elected committees of size k and elected committees of size
k + 1.
Following Elkind et al. (2017), we say that a csr R satisfies committee monotonicity if, for every
(C, V, p) ∈ E with |C| ≥ 3 and k ∈ [|C| − 2], we have that:
(1) if W ∈ R(C, V, p, k), then there exists W ′ ∈ R(C, V, p, k + 1) such that W ⊆W ′,
(2) if W ∈ R(C, V, p, k + 1), then there exists W ′ ∈ R(C, V, p, k) such that W ′ ⊆W .
By Elkind et al. (2017, Theorem 2), a best-k rule is committee monotone. As a consequence, we
immediately get the following result.
Proposition 5. S satisfies committee monotonicity.
As shown by Barberà and Coelho (2008), stability and committee monotonicity cannot co-exist.
From the example proposed by Barberà and Coelho (2008) in the proof of Proposition 8, we get the
next result.
Proposition 6. M fails both condition (1) and condition (2) of committee monotonicity. In partic-
ular, M fails committee monotonicity.
As pointed out by Elkind et al. (2017), the fact that committee monotonicity fails is not a matter
of concern in itself, because the desirability of that property strongly depends on the application.
The above negative result allows to shed light onto the nature of M.
Proposition 7. M is not a best-k rule.
Proof. By Elkind et al. (2017, Theorem 2), every best-k rule is committee-monotone. Since, by
Proposition 6, M fails committee monotonicity, we deduce that M is not a best-k rule.
We pass now to treat monotonicity properties for a single candidate. Such properties establish,
for a given candidate, how being an element of a selected committee for a given election impacts on
being an element of some selected committee for another election in which the considered candidate
behaves better.
A csr R is said to satisfy candidate monotonicity (resp. non-crossing monotonicity; membership
monotonicity) if, for every (C, V, p) ∈ E , k ∈ [|C| − 1], W ∗ ∈ R(C, V, p, k), x∗ ∈W ∗, and p′ obtained
by p by shifting x∗ one position forward in the preference relation of some voter by swapping its
position with some x̂ ∈ C, we have that there exists W ′ ∈ R(C, V, p′, k) such that x∗ ∈ W ′ (resp.
W ∗ ∈ R(C, V, p′, k) provided that x̂ 6∈W ∗; W ∗ ∈ R(C, V, p′, k)). Notice that candidate monotonicity
6
and non-crossing monotonicity are proposed by Elkind et al. (2017), and membership monotonicity
by Kamwa (2017a). Note also that membership monotonicity implies non-crossing monotonicity.
In order to study these three properties for S and M, we need to observe that, referring to the
notation used in the above definition, for every W ∈ 2Ck , the following facts hold true:
cp′(x
∗, x̂) = cp(x
∗, x̂) + 1, (2)
cp′(x̂, x
∗) = cp(x̂, x
∗)− 1, (3)
if x, y ∈ C with x 6= y and {x, y} 6= {x∗, x̂}, then cp′(x, y) = cp(x, y), (4)
S(p′, x̂) ∈ {S(p, x̂), S(p, x̂)− 1}, (5)
S(p′, x∗) ∈ {S(p, x∗), S(p, x∗) + 1}, (6)
if x ∈ C \ {x∗, x̂}, then S(p′, x) = S(p, x), (7)
if {x∗, x̂} ⊆W or {x∗, x̂} ⊆ C \W, then M(p′,W ) = M(p,W ), (8)
if x∗ ∈W, then M(p′,W ) ≥M(p,W ), (9)
if x∗ /∈W, then M(p′,W ) ≤M(p,W ). (10)
The proofs of (2)-(10) are elementary and thus omitted.
Our next propositions show that S satisfies more monotonicity properties than M. This result is
quite interesting. As noticed by Elkind et al. (2017) and Barberà and Coelho (2008), monotonicity
should be a desirable requirement in many situations like, for instance, when the finalists of a
competition are to be chosen or when some applicants competing for a position at a university are
to be short-listed for an interview. We believe that this expresses one of the main advantages of S
with regards to M.
Proposition 8. S satisfies non-crossing monotonicity and candidate monotonicity.
Proof. Let (C, V, p) ∈ E , k ∈ [|C| − 1], W ∗ ∈ S(p, k), x∗ ∈W ∗, and suppose that p′ is obtained by p
by shifting x∗ one position forward in the preference relation of some voter by swapping its position
with some x̂ ∈ C.
We first show non-crossing monotonicity. Assume then that x̂ /∈ W ∗. We want to show that
W ∗ ∈ S(p′, k). Let x ∈W ∗ and y 6∈W ∗. Then, since x 6= x̂ and y 6= x∗, by (5)-(7), we get
S(p′, x) ≥ S(p, x) ≥ S(p, y) ≥ S(p′, y).
We next show candidate monotonicity. This time we may have x̂ /∈ W ∗ or x̂ ∈ W ∗ and we need
to exhibit W ′ ∈ S(p′, k) with x∗ ∈W ′.
If x̂ /∈ W ∗, by non-crossing monotonicity, we know that W ∗ ∈ S(p′, k) and thus it is enough to
choose W ′ = W ∗.
Let now x̂ ∈W ∗. Then, since W ∗ ∈ S(p, k), we have S(p, x̂) ≥ S(p, y) for all y ∈ C \W ∗.
Assume first that, for every y ∈ C \W ∗, we have
S(p, x̂) > S(p, y). (11)
We show that, in this case, W ∗ ∈ S(p′, k). Let x ∈W ∗ and y ∈ C \W ∗. Then y /∈ {x∗, x̂} and thus,
by (7), we have S(p, y) = S(p′, y). If x 6= x̂, using (6), (7) and the fact that W ∗ ∈ S(p, k), we get
S(p′, x) ≥ S(p, x) ≥ S(p, y) = S(p′, y).
Moreover, by (5) and by (11), we also obtain
S(p′, x̂) ≥ S(p, x̂)− 1 ≥ S(p, y) = S(p′, y).
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Suppose next that there exists y′ ∈ C \W ∗ such that
S(p, x̂) = S(p, y′). (12)
Note that y′ /∈ {x∗, x̂}. Define W ′ = (W ∗ \ {x̂}) ∪ {y′} ∈ 2Ck . Note that x∗ ∈W ′ and that C \W ′ =
[C \ (W ∗ ∪ {y′})] ∪ {x̂}. We show that W ′ ∈ S(p′, k). Let x ∈W ′ and y ∈ C \W ′. Then y 6= x∗.
Consider first the case x 6= y′. Then x ∈ W ∗ \ {x̂}. If y 6= x̂, we have that y /∈ {x∗, x̂} and
y ∈ C \W ∗.
Thus, using (6), (7) and the fact that W ∗ ∈ S(p, k), we get S(p′, x) ≥ S(p, x) ≥ S(p, y) = S(p′, y).
If instead y = x̂, using (5)-(7), (12) and the fact that W ∗ ∈ S(p, k), we have
S(p′, x) ≥ S(p, x) ≥ S(p, y′) = S(p, x̂) ≥ S(p′, x̂).
It remains to treat the case x = y′, showing that S(p′, y′) ≥ S(p′, y). If y 6= x̂, then y ∈ C \W ∗.
Thus, recalling that y′ /∈ {x∗, x̂} and using (7), (12) and the fact that W ∗ ∈ S(p, k), we have
S(p′, y′) = S(p, y′) = S(p, x̂) ≥ S(p, y) = S(p′, y).
Finally note that, by (5), (7) and (12), we also have S(p′, y′) = S(p, y′) = S(p, x̂) ≥ S(p′, x̂).
Proposition 9. S does not satisfy membership monotonicity.
Proof. Consider C = [3], V = [3] and
p =
 1 2 32 3 2
3 1 1

Then {1, 2} ∈ S(p, 2) = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}}. If now 2 ∈ {1, 2} is swapped with 1 in the preferences of
voter 1, then {1, 2} 6∈ S(p′, 2) = {{2, 3}}.
Kamwa (2017a, Theorem 4) proves that M satisfies candidate monotonicity and does not satisfy
membership monotonicity. In Proposition 11 we show that also non-crossing monotonicity, a weaker
property than membership monotonicity, fails.
Proposition 10. M satisfies candidate monotonicity.
Proposition 11. M does not satisfy non-crossing monotonicity. In particular, M does not satisfy
membership monotonicity.
Proof. Consider C = [4], V = [7] and
p =

4 1 1 1 2 2 2
1 4 3 3 3 3 4
3 3 4 4 4 4 3
2 2 2 2 1 1 1
 (13)
Then {1, 2} ∈M(p, 2) = 2C2 . If now 1 ∈ {1, 2} is swapped with 4 6∈ {1, 2} in the preferences of voter
1, then {1, 2} 6∈M(p′, 2) = {{1, 3}}.
3.3 Consistency
In this section we deal with consistency, a classic property considered in the literature for single
winner voting rules and recently extended to the committee selection setting. Following Elkind
et al. (2017) and Kamwa (2017a), we say that R satisfies consistency (resp. weak consistency) if,
for every (C, V1, p1), (C, V2, p2) ∈ E with V1 ∩ V2 = ∅ and every k ∈ [|C| − 1], if R(C, V1, p1, k) ∩
R(C, V2, p2, k) 6= ∅, then we have R(C, V1, p1, k) ∩R(C, V2, p2, k) = R(C, V1 ∪ V2, p1 + p2, k) (resp.
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R(C, V1, p1, k) ∩ R(C, V2, p2, k) ⊆ R(C, V1 ∪ V2, p1 + p2, k)). Of course, consistency implies weak
consistency.
Kamwa (2017a, Theorem 6) proves that M fails consistency, even though from the proof we deduce
that the weak consistency property fails too. The fact that S does not satisfy (weak) consistency
too follows from Moulin (1988, Theorem 9.2). Thus, we get the next proposition.
Proposition 12. S and M fail weak consistency. In particular, S and M fail consistency.
The nature of S and M can be now better enlightened.
Proposition 13. S and M are not committee scoring rules.
Proof. By Elkind et al. (2017, Theorem 7), every committee scoring rule satisfies consistency. Since,
by Proposition 12, S and M fail consistency, we deduce that S and M are not committee scoring
rules.
3.4 Resolvability
In this section we adapt the standard notion of resolvability for single-winner voting rules (see, for
instance, Schulze, 2011; Tideman, 1987, 2006) to the committee selection setting. This property
guarantees that if a committee is selected by an election, then adding a further suitable vote that
committee becomes the unique winner.
We say that R satisfies resolvability (resp. weak resolvability) if, for every (C, V, p) ∈ E , k ∈
[|C|−1], W ∗ ∈ R(C, V, p, k) and q∗ ∈ L(C) such that, for every x ∈W ∗ and y ∈ C \W ∗, x q∗ y, we
have that if v∗ ∈ V \ V and (C, V ∗, p∗) ∈ E is defined by V ∗ = V ∪ {v∗}, p∗(v) = p(v) for all v ∈ V
and p∗(v∗) = q∗, then R(C, V ∗, p∗, k) = {W ∗} (resp. W ∗ ∈ R(C, V ∗, p∗, k)). Of course, resolvability
implies weak resolvability.
Proposition 14. S does not satisfy weak resolvability. In particular, S does not satisfy resolvability.
Proof. Consider (C, V, p) ∈ E , where C = [4], V = [7] and p is defined as in (13). It can be easily
checked that S(C, V, p, x) = 3 for all x ∈ C. Thus, {2, 3} ∈ S(C, V, p, 2) = 2C2 . Consider now
(C, V ∗, p∗) ∈ E , where V ∗ = [8] and p∗ is such that, for every v ∈ V , p∗(v) = p(v) and p∗(8) is the
linear order 3  2  1  4. Since S(C, V ∗, p∗, 2) = {{1, 3}}, we see that {2, 3} 6∈ S(C, V ∗, p∗, 2).
This shows that S does not satisfy weak resolvability.
Proposition 15. M satisfies weak resolvability and does not satisfy resolvability.
Proof. Let (C, V, p) ∈ E , k ∈ [|C| − 1], W ∗ ∈ R(C, V, p, k), q∗ ∈ L(C) such that x q∗ y for all
x ∈ W ∗ and y ∈ C \ W ∗, and v∗ ∈ V \ V . Consider (C, V ∗, p∗) ∈ E , where V ∗ = V ∪ {v∗},
p∗(v) = p(v) for all v ∈ V and p∗(v∗) = q∗. In order to get weak resolvability, we have to prove
that, for every W ∈ 2Ck , M(C, V ∗, p∗,W ) ≤ M(C, V ∗, p∗,W ∗). Note that, for every x, y ∈ C with
x 6= y, we have cp∗(x, y) ≤ cp(x, y) + 1. Thus, we also have M(C, V ∗, p∗,W ) ≤ M(C, V, p,W ) + 1.
On the other hand, for every x ∈W ∗ and y ∈ C \W ∗ we have cp∗(x, y) = cp(x, y) + 1 and therefore
M(C, V, p,W ∗) + 1 = M(C, V ∗, p∗,W ∗). Since M(C, V, p,W ) ≤M(C, V, p,W ∗), we then get
M(C, V ∗, p∗,W ) ≤M(C, V, p,W ) + 1 ≤M(C, V, p,W ∗) + 1 = M(C, V ∗, p∗,W ∗).
We now investigate resolvability. Consider (C, V, p) ∈ E , where C = [4], V = [7] and p is defined
as in (13). A simple check shows that {1, 2} ∈ M(C, V, p, 2) = 2C2 . Consider now (C, V ∗, p∗) ∈ E ,
where V ∗ = [8] and p∗ is such that, for every v ∈ V , p∗(v) = p(v) and p∗(8) is the linear order
2  1  3  4. Then {1, 2} is not the only element in M(C, V ∗, p∗, 2) because, for instance, we also
have {1, 3} ∈M(C, V ∗, p∗, 2). Thus M does not satisfy resolvability.
Note that, since M satisfies the property of fixed majority, if one keeps adding voters whose
preferences are described by a linear order q∗ ∈ L(C) such that, for every x ∈ W ∗ and y 6∈ W ∗,
x∗ q∗ y∗, then in a finite number of steps we reach the goal of having W ∗ as the only outcome of




We now come to explore how S and M behaves with respect to suitable adaptations of the Pareto
principle to the committee selection setting. According to Kamwa (2017a), we say that a csr R
satisfies the Pareto criterion (resp. weak Pareto criterion) if, for every (C, V, p) ∈ E , k ∈ [|C| − 1],
W ∗ ∈ R(C, V, p, k) and x∗, y∗ ∈ C with x∗ 6= y∗ and cp(x∗, y∗) = |V |, having y∗ ∈ W ∗ implies
x∗ ∈ W ∗ (resp. x∗ ∈ W ′ for some W ′ ∈ R(C, V, p, k)). Note that if k = 1 the definition means that
if y∗ is unanimously beaten by x∗ then it cannot be selected (resp. it cannot be the unique winner).
Clearly if R satisfies the Pareto criterion, then it satisfies the weak Pareto criterion.
Proposition 16. S satisfies the weak Pareto criterion but does not satisfy the Pareto criterion.
Proof. We first show that S satisfies the weak Pareto criterion. Let (C, V, p) ∈ E , k ∈ [|C| − 1],
W ∗ ∈ S(C, V, p, k), y∗ ∈ W ∗ and x∗ ∈ C, with x∗ 6= y∗, such that cp(x∗, y∗) = |V |. We need to find
W ′ ∈ S(C, V, p, k) such that x∗ ∈ W ′. If x∗ ∈ W ∗ we simply take W ′ = W ∗. Assume instead that
x∗ /∈ W ∗. Note that cp(x∗, y∗) = |V | implies cp(y∗, x∗) = 0 and thus S(p, y∗) = 0. By y∗ ∈ W ∗ we
also have S(p, y∗) ≥ S(p, y) for all y ∈ C \W ∗. It follows that S(p, y) = 0 for all y ∈ C \W ∗. Define
then W ′ = (W ∗ \ {y∗})∪ {x∗}. We show that W ′ ∈ S(C, V, p, k). Let z ∈W ′ and t ∈ C \W ′. Since
C \W ′ = [C \ (W ∗ ∪ {x∗})] ∪ {y∗}, we have that t ∈ C \W ∗ or that t = y∗. In both cases, we know
that S(p, t) = 0 and thus, trivially, S(p, z) ≥ S(p, t).
In order to see that S does not satisfy the Pareto criterion, consider (C, V, p) with C = [3],
k = 2 and assume that 1 p(v) 2 p(v) 3 for all v ∈ V . Then {1, 3} ∈ S(p, 2). Now we have that
cp(2, 3) = |V |, and 3 ∈ {1, 3}. However 2 6∈ {1, 3}.
The next proposition is proved in Kamwa (2017a).
Proposition 17. M satisfies the Pareto criterion. In particular, M satisfies the weak Pareto crite-
rion.
3.6 Symmetry
Let E = (C, V, p) ∈ E and R be a csr. Given k ∈ [|C| − 1], we say that R is k-flat on E if
R(C, V, p, k) = 2Ck . We say that R is flat on E if it is k-flat on E for all k ∈ [|C| − 1]. Moreover, R
is called symmetric if it is flat on every (C, V, p) ∈ E such that cp(x, y) = cp(y, x) for all x, y ∈ C,
with x 6= y. Note that a preference profile p satisfying the above symmetry request on cp is given,
for instance, by any p such that p and pr agree up to a reordering of the names of the voters. The
definitions of flatness and symmetry here considered are inspired by the properties with the same
name introduced by González-Dı́az et al. (2014) in the framework of ranking methods. Note that
the concept of symmetry appears also in Young (1975) in the context of voting rules with the name
of cancellation property.
We stress that being often flat can be considered a defect because if R is flat on an election, then
it cannot be used to make an effective decision. On the other hand, being flat on the elections with
profiles satisfying cp(x, y) = cp(y, x) can be considered a value. Indeed if the voters collectively do
not discriminate between any pair of candidates, it might be reasonable to require that every possible
committee must occur as outcome of the voting procedure.
We illustrate now the quite different behavior of S and M with respect to flatness and show that
they are both symmetric.
Proposition 18. Let E = (C, V, p) ∈ E. The following facts are equivalent:
(i) S is flat on E;
(ii) S is k-flat on E for some k ∈ [|C| − 1];
(iii) the function S(C, V, p, ·) : C → N0 is constant.
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Proof. (i)⇒ (ii) is obvious.
(ii) ⇒ (iii) By assumption, we have that S(C, V, p, k) = 2Ck . Assume by contradiction that the
function S(C, V, p, ·) : C → N0 is not constant. Then, there exist x, y ∈ C with x 6= y such that
S(C, V, p, y) > S(C, V, p, x). Since k ∈ [|C|−1], there exists W ∈ 2Ck such that x ∈W and y ∈ V \W .
Then W 6∈ S(C, V, p, k), a contradiction.
(iii)⇒ (i) is trivial.
Proposition 19. Let E = (C, V, p) ∈ E. If M is flat on E, then S is flat on E. The converse does
not hold.
Proof. Let M be flat on E. Then M is 1-flat on E. Since S and M for k = 1 coincide, we have that
S is 1-flat on E. Thus, by Proposition 18, we deduce that S is flat.
In order to show that S flat on E does not imply M flat on E, we consider the election E =
(C, V, p) given by C = [4], V = [5] and
p =

2 1 3 4 4
1 2 1 3 2
3 3 2 1 3
4 4 4 2 1
 .
It is immediately checked that S(p, x) = 2 for all x ∈ C and so, by Proposition 18, S is flat on E
while M(p, 3) = {{1, 2, 3}}. Thus, M is not 3-flat on E so that M is not flat on E.
By the above result, the set of elections in which S is flat is larger than the set of elections in
which M is flat. This represents a critical issue for S with respect to M.
Corollary 20. The property M is k-flat on E = (C, V, p) ∈ E, for some k ∈ [|C|−1], does not imply
the property M is flat on E.
Proof. The example used in Proposition 19 exhibits a case in which M is 1-flat but not 3-flat.
Proposition 21. The property M is k-flat on E = (C, V, p) ∈ E, for some k ∈ [|C| − 1], does not
imply the property S is flat on E.
Proof. Consider the election E = (C, V, p) given by C = [4], V = [8] and p defined in (14). It is
immediately checked that M(p, 2) = 2C2 so that M is 2-flat on E. On the other hand, we have
S(p, 1) = 4, S(p, 2) = S(p, 3) = S(p, 4) = 3. Thus, S is not flat on E.
Proposition 22. S and M are symmetric.
Proof. Let (C, V, p) ∈ E such that cp(x, y) = cp(y, x) for all x, y ∈ C, with x 6= y, and let k ∈
[|C| − 1]. Let x, y ∈ C with x 6= y. Since the preferences in the profile p are linear orders, we have
cp(x, y)+cp(y, x) = |V |. Thus |V | is even and cp(x, y) = |V |2 . As a consequence, for every W ∈ 2
C
k and
for every x ∈ C, we have that M(p,W ) = |V |2 and S(p, x) =
|V |




A considerable amount of contributions in social choice theory concerns the ability of single-winner
voting rules to select the Condorcet winner. Recall that, given (C, V, p) ∈ E and x ∈ C, x is a
Condorcet winner if, for every y ∈ C with x 6= y, cp(x, y) > |V |2 . Note that x ∈ C is a Condorcet
winner associated with the election (C, V, p) if and only if {x} is a Condorcet committee associated
with the same election. Kamwa (2017a) proposes the next property which refers to the behavior of a
csr when a Condorcet winner exists. A csr R satisfies the Condorcet winner criterion if, for every
(C, V, p) ∈ E , k ∈ [|C| − 1], W ∈ R(C, V, p, k) and x ∈ C a Condorcet winner, we have that x ∈W .
Proposition 23. S satisfies the Condorcet winner criterion.
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Proof. Consider (C, V, p) ∈ E , k ∈ [|C|−1] and W ∈ S(C, V, p, k). Assume that x ∈ C is a Condorcet
winner. Then S(p, x) > |V |2 . Moreover, for every y ∈ C \ {x}, we have S(p, y) ≤ cp(y, x) <
|V |
2 so
that S(p, y) < S(p, x). Assume now that x 6∈ W and pick y ∈ W . Then S(p, y) ≥ S(p, x), a
contradiction
Proposition 24. M does not satisfy the Condorcet winner criterion.
Proof. Consider the election E = (C, V, p) given by C = [4], V = [9] and
p =

1 1 2 2 3 3 3 4 4
3 4 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
2 3 4 4 2 2 1 1 1
4 2 3 3 4 4 4 3 2
 .
It is immediately checked that M(C, V, p, 2) = {{1, 3}, {2, 3}} and 1 is the Condorcet winner. Given
that 1 /∈ {2, 3}, we conclude that M does not satisfy the Condorcet winner criterion.
The next properties, namely local stability, consensus committee and weak consensus committee,
are inspired to the idea of proportional representation where the objective is to allocate seats in
representative bodies according to the number of votes received by candidates. We stress that local
stability is proposed by Aziz et al. (2017) while consensus committee by Elkind et al. (2017). The
notion of weak consensus committee is instead new.
Given (C, V, p) ∈ E , k ∈ [|C|−1] and W ∈ 2Ck , we say that W is a k-locally stable set with respect
to the Droop quota if, for every y ∈ C \W , we have that






A csr R is locally stable if, for every (C, V, p) ∈ E and k ∈ [|C| − 1] such that there exists a k-
locally stable set, we have that every W ∈ R(C, V, p, k) is a k-locally stable set; R satisfies consensus
committee (resp. weak consensus committee) if, for every (C, V, p) ∈ E , k ∈ [|C| − 1] and W ∈ 2Ck









voters, we have that R(C, V, p, k) = {W} (resp. W ∈ R(C, V, p, k)).
Proposition 25. There exists no csr R which is stable and locally stable.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that R is a stable and locally stable csr and consider C = [4],
V = [7] and
p =

1 2 3 2 1 3 1
3 3 4 3 3 4 3
4 4 1 4 4 2 4
2 1 2 1 2 1 2

Then {3, 4} is the unique Condorcet committee of size 2 and {1, 2} and {1, 3} are the only 2-locally
stable sets. Then, by stability, R(C, V, p, 2) = {{3, 4}} while, by local stability, R(C, V, p, 2) ⊆
{{1, 2}, {1, 3}}, a contradiction.
Proposition 26. S and M are not locally stable.
Proof. By Proposition 25, since M is stable, it cannot be locally stable. For what concerns S,
consider C = [4], V = [8] and
p =

1 2 2 2 3 4 4 4
3 1 1 3 1 1 2 3
4 3 3 4 4 2 3 1
2 4 4 1 2 3 1 2
 (14)
It is immediately checked that {2, 4} is the unique 2-locally stable set while S(C, V, p, 2) = {{1, 2},
{1, 3}, {1, 4}}.
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Proposition 27. S and M do not satisfy weak consensus committee. In particular, S and M do
not satisfy consensus committee.








and W = {1, 2, 3}. Any csr satisfying weak consensus committee should select W as winning
committee for the election (C, V, p) and k = 3. However, both W 6∈ S(C, V, p, 3) = 2C3 \ {W} and
W 6∈M(C, V, p, 3) = {{1, 2, 4}}.
We finally show that S and M both fail to be resolute and suffer the reversal bias, the Condorcet
loser paradox7 and the leaving member paradox.8 Recall that a csr R is resolute if, for every
(C, V, p) ∈ E and k ∈ [|C|−1], |R(C, V, p, k)| = 1; R suffers the reversal bias if there exist (C, V, p) ∈ E
and k ∈ [|C| − 1] such that |R(C, V, p, k)| = 1 and R(C, V, p, k) = R(C, V, pr, k); R suffers the
Condorcet loser paradox if there exist (C, V, p) ∈ E , k ∈ [|C| − 1] and W ∗ ∈ 2Ck such that W ∗ is a
Condorcet loser committee for (C, V, p), that is, for every x ∈W ∗ and y ∈ C \W ∗, cp(x, y) < |V |2 , and
R(C, V, p, k) = {W ∗}; R suffers the leaving member paradox if there exist (C, V, p) ∈ E , k ∈ [|C| − 1]
with k 6= 1, and x∗ ∈ C such that R(C, V, p, k) = {W ∗}, x∗ ∈ W ∗, R(C ′, V, p′, k) = {W ′} and
W ′ ∩ W ∗ = ∅, where C ′ = C \ {x∗} and p′ is the preference profile obtained by p erasing the
candidate x∗.9
Informally speaking, a csr is resolute if it always returns a single committee; a csr suffers the
reversal bias when for a given preference profile a unique committee is selected and reversing the
preferences of all the voters the same committee is still selected as unique outcome; a csr suffers
the Condorcet loser paradox if, for a given preference profile, the unique winning committee is a
Condorcet loser committee, that is, a committee having the property that each candidate which
does not belong to it is preferred by a majority of voters to every of its elements; a csr suffers the
leaving member paradox if for a certain election a unique committee of size k out of m candidates
is elected and if an elected candidate leaves the office for some reason and a new election on the
m − 1 remaining candidates is held, then a unique committee is elected and such a committee and
the original one are disjoint.
Proposition 28. S and M do not satisfy resoluteness.






Then S(p, 1) = M(p, 1) = {{1}, {2}}.
Proposition 29. S and M suffer the reversal bias.
Proof. Consider C = [4], V = [11], and
p =

3 1 2 3 1 2 4 4 4 4 4
2 3 1 2 3 1 3 1 2 2 1
1 2 3 1 2 3 2 3 1 3 3
4 4 4 4 4 4 1 2 3 1 2
 (15)
Then S(p, 1) = M(p, 1) = {{4}} and S(pr, 1) = M(pr, 1) = {{4}}.
7Those properties are largely studied in the literature in the setting of voting rules. See for instance, Bubboloni and
Gori (2016), Diss and Gehrlein (2012), Diss and Tlidi (2018), Duggan and Schwartz (2000), Fishburn and Gehrlein
(1976), Gehrlein and Lepelley (2010b), Jeong and Ju (2017), and Saari and Barney (2003). In the committee selection
setting, resoluteness and immunity to the reversal bias are studied in Bubboloni and Gori (2019) for a fixed number
of voters and alternatives; the Condorcet loser paradox is introduced here for the first time.
8See for instance, Diss and Doghmi (2016), Kamwa and Merlin (2015), and Staring (1986).
9Note that if k were allowed to be 1, then every csr would suffer the leaving member paradox.
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Note that, by Proposition 22, if (C, V, p) ∈ E and p is such that p and pr agree up to a reordering
of the names of the voters, then S(p, k) = M(p, k) = 2Ck for all k ∈ [|C| − 1], so that S(p, k) and
M(p, k) are not singletons. Thus, for those kind of elections reversal bias never occurs.
Proposition 30. S and M suffer the Condorcet loser paradox.
Proof. Consider C = [4], V = [11], and p as in (15). Then {4} is a Condorcet loser committee for
(C, V, p) and S(p, 1) = M(p, 1) = {{4}}.
Note that, according to Kamwa (2017a), a csr R satisfies the Condorcet loser criterion if, for
every (C, V, p) ∈ E , k ∈ [|C| − 1], W ∈ R(C, V, p, k) and x ∈ C a Condorcet loser, we have that
x 6∈W . Proposition 30 implies that S and M fail the Condorcet loser criterion. This fact for M was
proved by Kamwa (2017a, Theorem 2).
Proposition 31. S and M suffer the leaving member paradox.
Proof. Consider first S with C = [4], V = [4], and
p =

1 1 1 2
3 4 4 1
4 2 3 3
2 3 2 4

Then S(p, 2) = {{1, 2}}. Assume now that 1 drops out of the electoral competition for some reason
and consider (C ′, V, p′) ∈ E , where C ′ = {2, 3, 4} and p′ is obtained from p by erasing candidate 1 in
each column. Then, we get S(p′, 2) = {{3, 4}}.
Consider now M with C = [4], V = [11], and
p =

1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 4
4 4 4 1 1 4 2 2 4 4 1
2 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 2 2 2
3 2 2 4 4 3 4 4 1 1 3

Then M(p, 2) = {{1, 2}}. Assume now that 1 drops out of the competition for some reason and
consider (C ′, V, p′) ∈ E , where C ′ = {2, 3, 4} and p′ is obtained from p by erasing candidate 1 in each
column. Then, we get M(p′, 2) = {{3, 4}}.
A summary of our results is provided in Table 1.
4 Computational results
In this section we better investigate the resoluteness as well as the properties of suffering the reversal
bias, the Condorcet loser paradox and the leaving member paradox for S and M. We fix the number
m ∈ {3, 4} of candidates, the number n ≥ 2 of the voters and the size k ∈ [m− 1] of the committee
to be selected and we focus only on elections (C, V, p) with C and V fixed and such that |C| = m
and |V | = n.10 We then study each of the considered properties through a computational approach
estimating the probability of its occurrence for S and M and providing a comparison of the results
obtained with those obtained for the Borda, the Plurality, the Negative Plurality and the Bloc csrs.11
We emphasize that the Bloc csr agrees with the Plurality csr when k = 1 and with the Negative
Plurality csr when k = m − 1. Recall also that S agrees with M when k = 1. In the last part of
the section we also study the probability that S and M agree on the same unique committee as well
as the probability of the agreement of each of them with the Borda csr. Before giving the results
of our analysis, we first describe in Section 4.1 the methodology applied in order to calculate our
probabilities.
10Note that when, m ≤ 2 or n = 1, the analysis of the considered properties turns out to be straightforward.
11See Diss and Doghmi (2016) and Elkind et al. (2017) for the definitions of these csrs.
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4.1 Evaluating the probability of voting situations
Let us first present our main computational assumption, that is, the Impartial Anonymous Culture
(IAC). With m candidates, there are m! possible individual preferences (linear orders) which we order
in some fashion. A voting situation is a vector (n1, . . . , ni, . . . , nm!) such that
∑m!
i=1 ni = n, where the
integer ni is the number of individuals voting the i-th linear order. The IAC condition stipulates that
all voting situations are equiprobable. This assumption, introduced by Gehrlein and Fishburn (1976),
is one of the most used assumption in social choice theory when computing the theoretical probability
of electoral events. For more details on the IAC condition and other well-known assumptions, we
refer the reader to the recent books by Gehrlein and Lepelley (2011, 2017). Under IAC, obtaining
the probability of an electoral event is accomplished by the computation of two elements. The first





. The second one is the number of
voting situations associated with the property under examination. This can be in general reduced
to a finite system of linear constraints with rational coefficients. For instance, if C = {x, y, z}, there
exist 3!=6 linear orders on C: x  y  z (n1), x  z  y (n2), y  x  z (n3), y  z  x (n4),
z  x  y (n5), and z  y  x (n6). In this setting, evaluating the situations for which the Plurality
csr selects {x, y} as unique outcome for a given number of voters n is equivalent to finding the
number of voting situations (n1, . . . , n6) subject to the following conditions: n1 + n2 − n5 − n6 > 0
(the Plurality score of candidate x is greater than the one of z), n3 +n4−n5−n6 > 0 (the Plurality
score of y is greater than the one of z), ni ≥ 0 for each i ∈ [6], and
∑6
i=1 ni = n.
As recently pointed out in the literature of social choice theory, Ehrhart polynomials are the
appropriate mathematical tool to study such problems (Gehrlein and Lepelley, 2011, 2017; Lepel-
ley et al., 2008; Wilson and Pritchard, 2007). In fact, they have been widely used in numerous
studies analyzing the probability of electoral events in the case of three-candidate elections under
IAC assumption (Courtin et al., 2015; Diss, 2015; Diss et al., 2012; Gehrlein and Lepelley, 2011,
2017; Gehrlein et al., 2015, 2016, 2018; Kamwa and Valognes, 2017; Lepelley et al., 2017; Smaoui et
al., 2016). There exist strong algorithms that enable to specify the Ehrhart polynomials for many
problems in the case of three-candidate elections. In this paper, all our results for the case of three
candidates are obtained by using the parameterized Barvinok’s algorithm.12 After obtaining the
Ehrhart polynomials corresponding to each of the considered properties, we evaluate these polyno-
mials for any needed number of voters and we get the desired probabilities. As noticed by Lepelley
et al. (2008), the different algorithms that can be used in the three-candidate framework do not
allow to deal with four-candidate elections, where the total number of variables, i.e., possible linear
orderings, is 4! = 24. However, recent developments within the polytope theory may allow to obtain
exact results for the case of m = 4 and a small number of voters. These results are obtained using
the algorithms of Normaliz (Bruns et al., 2017a) which is, to the best of our knowledge, the only
program able to compute the number of voting situations in polytopes corresponding to elections
with up to four candidates. The reader interested in a deeper understanding of the algorithms of
Normaliz is refereed to Bruns et al. (2019) who describe several results obtained in four-candidate
elections. This software can do all computations in dimension 24, but the limitation of the method
is that all voting situations (n1, . . . , nm!) that verify the required conditions of the considered voting
event are enumerated and stored. Thus, this method needs relatively high memory when the number
of voters increases. Moreover, the computation time rises accordingly. Consequently, exact results
are obtained with n ∈ {2, . . . , 9} and m = 4 and we use computer simulations in order to evaluate
the probabilities for n > 9.13 We describe now the Monte-Carlo simulation methodology applied in
order to estimate our probabilities in the same spirit as the Impartial Anonymous Culture condition.
Let us consider as an example the probability of resoluteness.
1. At the beginning of the evaluation, we randomly generate a voting situation of length m!.
2. In the second step, we check whether the conditions of the resoluteness are fulfilled or not.
12For a detailed description of algorithms computing Ehrhart polynomials, we recommend the report by Verdoolaege
et al. (2005).
13This is really possible for all the scoring csrs we are considering here but, unfortunately, this is not true when we
consider S and M. For those csrs exact probabilities can be obtained only for n ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5}.
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3. These two steps are iterated 1, 000, 000 times to obtain the number of voting situations for
which resoluteness holds.
4. Finally, the probability of resoluteness is calculated as the quotient of the number obtained in
step 3 over the total number of simulated voting situations, i.e., 1, 000, 000.14
Another technique is used in this paper in order to obtain exact results when the number of
candidates is m = 4 and the number of voters tends to infinity. In this case, the calculations
of the limiting probability under IAC condition are reduced to computation of volumes of convex
polytopes. For this, our volumes are found with the use of the algorithm Convex which is a Maple
package for convex geometry by Franz (2017). This package works with the same general procedure
that was implemented by Cervone et al. (2005) and recently used in other studies, e.g., Diss and
Doghmi (2016), Diss and Gehrlein (2012, 2015), Gehrlein et al. (2015), and Moyouwou and Tchantcho
(2017).15
Note that in what follows the probability values 0 and 0.0000 have different meanings. In fact,
the first one corresponds to an exact value while the second one is obtained using our simulation
method. Note also that, in order to simplify some computations, we use some further propositions
about S and M stated and proved in the appendix.
4.2 The probability of resoluteness
Our first concern is the probability of resoluteness. The results of our computations are provided in
Tables 2 to 6. We stress that the analysis of the probability of resoluteness of the classical scoring
csrs considered here is new in the literature.
It is intuitive that ties are highly unlikely if the number of voters is large so that the probability
of resoluteness is expected to approach 1 as n increases. Moreover, it is natural to understand that
the probability of ties highly depends on whether the number of voters is odd or even, with ties more
probable for an even number of voters. Those facts are confirmed by our results.
We observe very different behaviors of the considered csrs for odd and even numbers of voters.
For instance, with m = 3 and k = 1, both S and M (which agree in this case) perform better
than the other five csrs when the number of voters is odd, but the scoring csrs have a superior
performance when the number of voters is even. In this case, the Borda csr performs very well in
comparison with the other considered scoring csrs. When m = 3, k = 2 and n is odd, our results
show that M is the best csr, while S performs the worst. With n even, S still is the worst scenario,
but it is found that some scoring csrs can perform better than M. Finally, when the number of
candidates increases to m = 4, it appears that usually the Borda csr has a greater probability of
resoluteness than M which in turn leads to a better performance than some scoring csrs. Note that
S performs the worst in most cases. This remains in general true independently of the target size of
the committee.
It is worth mentioning that some theoretical facts about the resoluteness of the considered csrs
help in building the tables. In particular, via very simple arguments involving the concept of reversal
of a preference profile, it can be proved that the probability of resoluteness of the Borda csr is the
same for k = 1 and k = m − 1; the probability of resoluteness of the Plurality csr with k = 1 is
the same as the one of the Negative Plurality csr with k = m − 1; the probability of resoluteness
of Negative Plurality csr with k = 1 is the same as the one of Plurality csr with k = m− 1; when
m is even and k = m2 , the probability of resoluteness of the Plurality csr and the one for Negative
Plurality csr are the same. Moreover, from Proposition 35, we also get that the probability of
resoluteness of M is the same for k = 1 and k = m− 1.
14The MATLAB code of our simulations is available upon request.
15Once again this technique can not be used for S and M for which obtaining the probabilities in the limit case is
only possible with computer simulations. We consider for them a number of voters n = 100, 000.
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4.3 The probability of suffering the reversal bias
In Tables 7 to 11, we collect our results about the probability of suffering the reversal bias. Saari
and Barney (2003) and Bubboloni and Gori (2016) prove several results about the reversal bias when
k = 1. On the basis of our results and those by Bubboloni and Gori (2016), we can deduce interesting
facts concerning the computations we are going to perform. In particular, by Bubboloni and Gori
(2016, Theorem A), we get that S and M are immune to the reversal bias for m = 3 and k = 1;
from Proposition 33, S is immune to the reversal bias for m = 3 and k = 2 as well as for m = 4
and k = 3; when m = 4, by Bubboloni and Gori (2016, Theorem A), we have that S and M are
immune to the reversal bias if and only if n ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5, 7}; by Bubboloni and Gori (2016, Theorem
A) and Corollary 37, M is immune to the reversal bias for m = 3 and k = 2; from Corollary 36, M
is immune to the reversal bias for m = 4 and k = 2; from Corollary 37, the probability for M to be
immune to the reversal bias for m = 4 and k = 1 is the same as for m = 4 and k = 3.
It is also immediate to show that the Borda csr is always immune to the reversal bias; the
probability of suffering the reversal bias of the Plurality csr (Bloc csr) with k = 1 is the same as
the one of the Negative Plurality csr (Bloc csr) with k = m − 1; the probability of suffering the
reversal bias of the Negative Plurality csr with k = 1 is the same as the one of the Plurality csr
with k = m − 1; when m is even and k = m2 , the probability of suffering the reversal bias of the
Plurality csr and the one of the Negative Plurality csr are the same; the Bloc csr is immune to
the reversal bias.
It turns out that the most interesting cases to study for comparing S and M to the other five
csrs correspond to m = 4 with k = 1 and k = 3. Our computations reveal that, yet again, S and
M perform better than the other considered csrs (except Borda). However, M appears to be more
vulnerable to the reversal bias than S for m = 4 and k = 3.
Finally, the computations made suggest to conjecture that S is immune to the reversal bias if
m = 4 and k = 2. This is, at the moment, an open problem.
4.4 The probability of suffering the Condorcet loser paradox
Tables 12 to 16 describe our results about the probability of suffering the Condorcet loser paradox
provided a Condorcet loser committee exists. It is important to notice that this paradox is also known
in the setting of voting rules as the strong Borda paradox. We refer the reader to Diss and Gehrlein
(2012); Diss and Tlidi (2018); Fishburn and Gehrlein (1976); Gehrlein and Lepelley (2010b), among
others.
It is important to notice that, since a Condorcet loser committee for (C, V, p) is a Condorcet
committee for (C, V, pr), if a csr is Condorcet consistent and immune to the reversal bias then it
is immune to the Condorcet loser paradox. Since M is Condorcet consistent, the analysis made in
the previous section can be used to get some information about the Condorcet loser paradox for M.
For instance, with m = 4 and k = 1, Table 9 shows that M is immune to the reversal bias when
n ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5, 7}. This remains true for the immunity to the Condorcet loser paradox as shown in
Table 14. It is well known that the Borda csr is immune to the Condorcet loser paradox when k = 1
and it is immediate to show that the probability of suffering the Condorcet loser paradox of the
Plurality csr (Bloc csr) with k = 1 is the same as the one of the Negative Plurality csr (Bloc csr)
with k = m − 1; the probability of suffering the Condorcet loser paradox of the Negative Plurality
csr with k = 1 is the same as the one of the Plurality csr with k = m − 1; when m is even and
k = m2 , the probability of suffering the Condorcet loser paradox of the Plurality csr and the one
of the Negative Plurality csr are the same. Notice that the results in Table 12 for Plurality and
Negative Plurality when the number of voters is large are in agreement with results by Gehrlein and
Lepelley (2010b).
From the tables we understand that the probability of observing the Condorcet loser paradox can
never exceed 0.0315 with m = 3 and 0.0240 with m = 4 under all the csrs that we consider in this
paper. In other words, the probability of observing this paradox should be rare, but not impossible
to observe particularly when the number of voters increases. Our results also show that the use of
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csrs like Borda, M and S will clearly tend to minimize the probability of observing the Condorcet
loser paradox, with a certain advantage for S and Borda when m = 4 and k = 3.
Our probability calculations suggest to conjecture that the Borda csr is immune to the Condorcet
loser paradox whatever the values of m, n, and k are. In addition, except for the situation with m = 4
and k = 1, S seems to be immune to the Condorcet loser paradox for all the other values of m and
k that we consider in this paper. Again these conjectures are, at the moment, open problems.
4.5 The probability of suffering the leaving member paradox
The probability of suffering the leaving member paradox is illustrated in Table 17. This paradox
has been introduced by Staring (1986). Kamwa and Merlin (2015) considered the probability of
this paradox under the four scoring csrs presented in this paper with the Impartial Culture (IC)16
assumption for large electorates. Considering the IAC condition, Diss and Doghmi (2016) extended
the results of Kamwa and Merlin (2015) in many directions. In particular, the results we propose for
the limit case of the scoring csrs are taken from Diss and Doghmi (2016). Since we are focusing only
on m ∈ {3, 4}, the leaving member paradox only occurs in the case m = 4 and k = 2. We deduce
then from our results that M has a better performance than the other considered csrs except for
some small number of voters; in most cases S performs better than the Plurality csr and the Bloc
csr. The Bloc csr appears to be the worst csr according to this criterion.
4.6 The probability of resolute-agreement
We know that for certain voting situations the set of committees selected by S differs from the set
of committees selected by M. However, in some cases, they both select the same unique committee.
Here we study the probability of such a situation, which we refer to as resolute-agreement between
S and M. Recall that S equals M when k = 1. Moreover, when m = 3, k = 2 and under the IAC
hypothesis, Kamwa (2017b) computes the probability of having voting situations where S and M
coincide.
The results of our calculations are described in Table 18. We can make some observations based
upon this Table. First of all, the probability of resolute-agreement is smaller when there is an even
number of voters than when there is an odd number of voters. One of the possible reasons for that
is that having ties for S or M, which are more likely in the even case, implies no resolute-agreement
between the two csrs. We also observe that, our results indicate that increasing an odd (even)
number of voters implies an increase in the probability of resolute-agreement. Moreover, when the
number of voters is large the probability of resolute-agreement reaches 70% for m = 3 and k = 2 and
60% with m = 4 and k = 2 or k = 3. Finally, it seems from the tables that, for fixed m and n, with
n large, the probability of resolute-agreement decreases as the size of the committee to be elected
increases.
We also study the probability of resolute-agreement between S and the Borda csr (Table 19),
and between M and the Borda csr (Table 20). Our results show that there exists, at least in three-
candidate and four-candidate elections, an important set of voting situations where the Borda csr
and one of the two extensions of the Simpson voting rule agree. Surprisingly, this probability reaches
more than 80% for many cases with only 101 voters. Moreover, our results indicate that the Borda
csr is more likely to agree with M than with S except for a small even number of voters (n ≤ 6).
Since the probability of resoluteness tends to rapidly increase as the number of voters increases, we
know that each of the studied csrs usually selects a unique committee as the number of voters is
large. Hence, for large electorates, the probability of resolute-agreement here considered should be
close to the probability of equality. Note that, using a simple argument based on the concept of
reversal of a preference profile, it can be proved that the probability of resolute-agreement between
M and the Borda when k = 1 is the same as the one when k = m− 1.
16This is another assumption widely used for analyzing the probability of electoral events. Under this assumption,
the preference relation of each voter is drawn uniformly at random from the set of all possible linear orders.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper we provide a careful comparison of two possible extensions of the Simpson voting rule
to the committee selection setting, namely the Simpson csr S and the Maximin csr M. To that
purpose, we consider some well-established properties and we introduce some new ones aiming to
compare the behavior of S and M by testing those properties. Our findings are summarized in Table
1. There are some properties shared by S and M and others not satisfied by both. Of course, it
is looking at those properties that are not shared by S and M that it is possible to recognize the
peculiarities of the two csrs. That allows to better qualify the range of applications of S and M.
In fact, S seems to be more appealing for shortlisting because it satisfies committee monotonicity,
non-crossing monotonicity and Condorcet winner criterion; M seems instead to be more appropriate
for finding representatives because it satisfies stability, weak-resolvability and Pareto criterion. In
order to better highlight the performances of S and M, we also study some of the properties failed
by both csrs through a computational approach estimating the probability of their occurrence, not
only for S and M, but also for the Borda, the Plurality, the Negative Plurality and the Bloc csrs
giving a wide comparison with these classic csrs, as well.
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Appendix
Proposition 32. Let (C, V, p) ∈ E, k ∈ [|C| − 1] and W ∗ ∈ 2Ck . Then S(p, k) = {W ∗} if and only
if, for every x ∈W ∗ and y ∈ C \W ∗, S(p, x) > S(p, y).
Proof. Let S(p, k) = {W ∗}. Assume, by contradiction, that there exists x∗ ∈ W ∗ and y∗ ∈ C \W ∗
such that S(p, x∗) ≤ S(p, y∗). Since for every x ∈ W ∗ and y ∈ C \W ∗, we surely have S(p, x) ≥
S(p, y), we then have
S(p, x∗) = S(p, y∗). (16)
Define W ′ = (W ∗\{x∗})∪{y∗} ∈ 2Ck . We reach the desired contradiction showing that W ′ ∈ S(p, k).
Let x ∈ W ′ and y ∈ C \W ′ = C \ (W ∗ ∪ {y∗}) ∪ {x∗} and show that S(p, x) ≥ S(p, y). Let us first
assume that x 6= y∗ and y 6= x∗. Then we have x ∈W ∗ and y ∈ C \W ∗ and thus, since W ∗ ∈ S(p, k),
we get S(p, x) ≥ S(p, y). Let next x = y∗ and y = x∗. Then by (16), S(p, x) = S(p, y∗) = S(p, x∗) =
S(p, y). Let now x = y∗ and y 6= x∗. Then y ∈ C \W ∗ and, by (16) and W ∗ ∈ S(p, k), we obtain
S(p, x) = S(p, y∗) = S(p, x∗) ≥ S(p, y).
Let finally be x 6= y∗ and y = x∗. Then x ∈W ∗ and y ∈ C \W ∗. Hence, by W ∗ ∈ S(p, k) and (16),
we get
S(p, x) ≥ S(p, y∗) = S(p, x∗) = S(p, y).
Assume next that W ∗ ∈ 2Ck is such that, for every x ∈W ∗ and y ∈ C \W ∗,
S(p, x) > S(p, y). (17)
Then W ∗ ∈ S(p, k). We want to show that W ∗ is the only element in S(p, k). Pick W ∈ 2Ck \ {W ∗}.
Since W ∗ and W have the same size k, there exist y ∈ W \W ∗ and x ∈ W ∗ \W. Thus, by (17), we
have S(p, x) > S(p, y), which excludes W ∈ S(p, k).
Proposition 33. Let (C, V, p) ∈ E be such that |S(p, |C| − 1)| = |S(pr, |C| − 1)| = 1. Then
S(p, |C| − 1) 6= S(pr, |C| − 1).
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Proof. Assume by contradiction that there exists W ⊆ C with |W | = |C| − 1 such that
S(p, |C| − 1) = S(pr, |C| − 1) = {W}.
Let x∗ be the unique element of the set C \W . Then, by Proposition 32, we have that, for every
x ∈ W , S(p, x∗) < S(p, x) and S(pr, x∗) < S(pr, x). Since, for every x, y ∈ C with x 6= y, cp(y, x) =




∗, y) < min
y 6=x
cp(x, y) and max
y 6=x∗
cp(x
∗, y) > max
y 6=x
cp(x, y).
Thus, there exist ym, yM ∈W such that, for every x ∈W ,
cp(x
∗, ym) < min
y 6=x
cp(x, y) and cp(x
∗, yM ) > max
y 6=x
cp(x, y).
Then, for every x ∈ W and y ∈ C \ {x}, cp(x∗, ym) < cp(x, y) < cp(x∗, yM ). Consequently, we have
that
cp(x
∗, ym) < cp(ym, x
∗) < cp(x
∗, yM ) and cp(x





∗, ym) < |V | − cp(x∗, ym) < cp(x∗, yM ) and cp(x∗, ym) < |V | − cp(x∗, yM ) < cp(x∗, yM ).
Thus, we have that |V | − cp(x∗, ym) < cp(x∗, yM ) and cp(x∗, ym) < |V | − cp(x∗, yM ) from which we
deduce the contradiction |V | < cp(x∗, ym) + cp(x∗, yM ) < |V |.
Lemma 34. Let (C, V, p) ∈ E and W ⊆ C with |W | ∈ [|C| − 1]. Then M(p,W ) = M(pr, C \W ).
Proof. Simply observe that C \W ∈ C, |C \W | ∈ [|C| − 1] and that
M(p,W ) = min
x∈W,y∈C\W
cp(x, y) = min
x∈W,y∈C\W
cpr (y, x) = M(p
r, C \W ).
Proposition 35. Let (C, V, p) ∈ E, k ∈ [|C| − 1] and W ∗ ∈ 2Ck . Then W ∗ ∈M(p, k) if and only if
C \W ∗ ∈M(pr, |C| − k). In particular, M(p, k) = {W ∗} if and only if M(pr, |C| − k) = {C \W ∗}.
Proof. Consider the following statements:
1. W ∗ ∈M(p, k);
2. for every W ∈ 2Ck , M(p,W ∗) ≥M(p,W );
3. for every W ∈ 2Ck , M(pr, C \W ∗) ≥M(pr, C \W );
4. for every W ∈ 2C|C|−k, M(p
r, C \W ∗) ≥M(pr,W );
5. C \W ∗ ∈M(pr, |C| − k).
Using Lemma 34, it is immediate to show that, for every i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, statement i is equivalent to
statement i+ 1. Then statement 1 is equivalent to statement 5 and the proof is completed.
Corollary 36. Let (C, V, p) ∈ E be such that |C| is even and |M(p, |C|/2)| = |M(pr, |C|/2)| = 1.
Then M(p, |C|/2) 6= M(pr, |C|/2).
Proof. Assume that M(p, |C|/2) = {W ∗}. Then by Proposition 35 we have that M(pr, |C|−|C|/2) =
M(pr, |C|/2) = {C \W ∗}. Since W ∗ 6= C \W ∗, the proof is complete.
Corollary 37. Let (C, V, p) ∈ E and k ∈ [|C| − 1]. The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) M(p, k) = M(pr, k) and |M(p, k)| = 1;
(ii) M(p, |C| − k) = M(pr, |C| − k) and |M(p, |C| − k)| = 1.
Proof. Assume that (i) holds true. Then there exists W ∗ ∈ 2Ck such that M(p, k) = M(pr, k) =
{W ∗}. Then, by Proposition 35, we have that M(p, |C| − k) = M(pr, |C| − k) = {C \W ∗} which
implies (ii). The proof that (ii) implies (i) is analogous.
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Anonymity 3 (Prop. 1) 3 (Prop. 1)
Neutrality 3 (Prop. 1) 3 (Prop. 1)
Homogeneity 3 (Prop. 1) 3 (Prop. 1)
Non-Imposition 3 (Prop. 3) 3 (Prop. 4)
Strong Non-Imposition* 7 (Prop. 3) 3 (Prop. 4)
Weak Unanimity 3 (Prop. 3) 3 (Prop. 4)
Strong Unanimity 7 (Prop. 2) 3 (Prop. 4)
Fixed Majority 7 (Prop. 2) 3 (Prop. 4)
Weak Consensus Committee* 7 (Prop. 27) 7 (Prop. 27)
Consensus Committee 7 (Prop. 27) 7 (Prop. 27)
Weak Pareto criterion* 3 (Prop. 16) 3 (Prop. 17)
Pareto criterion 7 (Prop. 16) 3 (Prop. 17)
Condorcet Consistency 7 (Prop. 2) 3 (Prop. 4)
Stability 7 (Prop. 2) 3 (Prop. 4)
Local Stability 7 (Prop. 26) 7 (Prop. 26)
Condorcet Winner Criterion 3 (Prop. 23) 7 (Prop. 24)
Immunity to the Condorcet Loser Paradox* 7 (Prop. 30) 7 (Prop. 30)
Condorcet Loser Criterion 7 (Prop. 30) 7 (Prop. 30)
Committee Monotonicity 3 (Prop. 5) 7 (Prop. 6)
Membership Monotonicity 7 (Prop. 9) 7 (Prop. 11)
Non-crossing Monotonicity 3 (Prop. 8 ) 7 (Prop. 11)
Candidate Monotonicity 3 (Prop. 8 ) 3 (Prop. 10)
Weak Consistency 7 (Prop. 12) 7 (Prop. 12)
Consistency 7 (Prop. 12) 7 (Prop. 12)
Weak Resolvability* 7 (Prop. 14) 3 (Prop. 15)
Resolvability* 7 (Prop. 14) 7 (Prop. 15)
Symmetry* 3 (Prop. 22) 3 (Prop. 22)
Resoluteness 7 (Prop. 28) 7 (Prop. 28)
Immunity to the Reversal Bias 7 (Prop. 29) 7 (Prop. 29)
Immunity to the Leaving Member Paradox 7 (Prop. 31) 7 (Prop. 31)
The properties marked with * are new in the committee selection literature.
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Table 2: The probability of resoluteness: m = 3 and k = 1





2 0.4286 0.4286 0.7143 0.5714
3 0.9643 0.8571 0.8571 0.6429
4 0.6190 0.7857 0.8571 0.5952
5 0.9524 0.7857 0.8810 0.7381
6 0.7143 0.8377 0.8831 0.7662
7 0.9545 0.8788 0.9091 0.7424
8 0.7692 0.8298 0.9044 0.8089
9 0.9590 0.8931 0.9201 0.8242
50 0.9530 0.9703 0.9806 0.9588
51 0.9888 0.9725 0.9810 0.9595
100 0.9758 0.9854 0.9900 0.9782
101 0.9941 0.9851 0.9901 0.9788
1000 0.9975 0.9985 0.9990 0.9978
1001 0.9994 0.9985 0.9990 0.9978
∞ 1 1 1 1
Table 3: The probability of resoluteness: m = 3 and k = 2
n S M Plurality Borda
Negative
Plurality = Bloc
2 0.4286 0.4286 0.5714 0.7143 0.4286
3 0.4286 0.9643 0.6429 0.8571 0.8571
4 0.5714 0.6190 0.5952 0.8571 0.7857
5 0.5952 0.9524 0.7381 0.8810 0.7857
6 0.6623 0.7143 0.7662 0.8831 0.8377
7 0.6818 0.9545 0.7424 0.9091 0.8788
8 0.7226 0.7692 0.8089 0.9044 0.8298
9 0.7373 0.9590 0.8242 0.9201 0.8931
50 0.9413 0.9530 0.9588 0.9806 0.9703
51 0.9423 0.9888 0.9595 0.9810 0.9725
100 0.9697 0.9758 0.9782 0.9900 0.9854
101 0.9700 0.9941 0.9788 0.9901 0.9851
1000 0.9969 0.9975 0.9978 0.9990 0.9985
1001 0.9969 0.9994 0.9978 0.9990 0.9985
∞ 1 1 1 1 1
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Table 4: The probability of resoluteness: m = 4 and k = 1





2 0.2800 0.2800 0.7200 0
3 0.9015 0.6677 0.8185 0.3323
4 0.4807 0.7754 0.8274 0.5169
5 0.8733 0.6769 0.8481 0.5692
6 0.5155 0.6819 0.8618 0.5491
7 0.8259 0.7799 0.8730 0.6063
8 0.5787 0.7772 0.8829 0.6608
9 0.8346 0.7652 0.8901 0.6863
50 0.8841 0.8899 0.9615 0.9245
51 0.9468 0.8886 0.9619 0.9244
100 0.9411 0.9441 0.9804 0.9591
101 0.9716 0.9443 0.9805 0.9601
1000 0.9942 0.9930 0.9993 0.9949
1001 0.9955 0.9933 0.9996 0.9966
∞ 1 1 1 1
Table 5: The probability of resoluteness: m = 4 and k = 2




2 0.4400 0.2000 0.7200 0.6400 0.7200 0.2000
3 0.2769 0.8492 0.5815 0.8031 0.5815 0.8031
4 0.5115 0.4048 0.3805 0.7774 0.3805 0.4769
5 0.4508 0.8083 0.5590 0.8227 0.5590 0.7460
6 0.5197 0.4219 0.7017 0.8245 0.7017 0.6103
7 0.4825 0.7292 0.6367 0.8477 0.6367 0.7454
8 0.5495 0.4857 0.6119 0.8517 0.6119 0.6808
9 0.5422 0.7416 0.6841 0.8665 0.6841 0.7603
50 0.8563 0.8448 0.8812 0.9500 0.8825 0.8939
51 0.8593 0.9065 0.8817 0.9477 0.8819 0.8983
100 0.9219 0.9106 0.9340 0.9719 0.9341 0.9459
101 0.9262 0.9455 0.9380 0.9779 0.9383 0.9483
1000 0.9908 0.9739 0.9916 0.9966 0.9989 0.9946
1001 0.9964 0.9825 0.9920 0.9973 0.9949 0.9962
∞ 1 1 1 1 1 1
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Table 6: The probability of resoluteness: m = 4 and k = 3
n S M Plurality Borda
Negative
Plurality = Bloc
2 0.2400 0.2800 0 0.7200 0.2800
3 0.4000 0.9015 0.3323 0.8185 0.6677
4 0.4356 0.4807 0.5169 0.8274 0.7754
5 0.5245 0.8733 0.5692 0.8481 0.6769
6 0.5414 0.5155 0.5491 0.8618 0.6819
7 0.5871 0.8259 0.6063 0.8730 0.7799
8 0.6051 0.5787 0.6608 0.8829 0.7772
9 0.6297 0.8346 0.6863 0.8901 0.7652
50 0.8767 0.8841 0.9245 0.9615 0.8899
51 0.8800 0.9468 0.9244 0.9619 0.8886
100 0.9341 0.9411 0.9591 0.9804 0.9441
101 0.9374 0.9716 0.9601 0.9805 0.9443
1000 0.9920 0.9942 0.9949 0.9993 0.9930
1001 0.9945 0.9955 0.9966 0.9996 0.9933
∞ 1 1 1 1 1
Table 7: The probability of suffering the reversal bias: m = 3 and k = 1
n
S = M Plurality Negative
& Borda = Bloc Plurality
2 0 0 0.1429
3 0 0 0.1071
4 0 0.0238 0.0714
5 0 0 0.1190
6 0 0.0260 0.1234
7 0 0.0379 0.1061
8 0 0.0210 0.1352
9 0 0.0420 0.1379
50 0 0.0776 0.1856
51 0 0.0789 0.1859
100 0 0.0852 0.1938
101 0 0.0850 0.1942
1000 0 0.0918 0.2027
1001 0 0.0918 0.2027
∞ 0 0.0926 0.2037
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& Borda Plurality = Bloc
2 0 0.1429 0
3 0 0.1071 0
4 0 0.0714 0.0238
5 0 0.1190 0
6 0 0.1234 0.0260
7 0 0.1061 0.0379
8 0 0.1352 0.0210
9 0 0.1379 0.0420
50 0 0.1856 0.0776
51 0 0.1859 0.0789
100 0 0.1938 0.0852
101 0 0.1942 0.0850
1000 0 0.2027 0.0918
1001 0 0.2027 0.0918
∞ 0 0.2037 0.0926
Table 9: The probability of suffering the reversal bias: m = 4 and k = 1




2 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0.0246 0
4 0 0.0328 0.0492 0
5 0 0.0215 0.0513 0
6 0.0009 0.0163 0.0426 0
7 0 0.0380 0.0548 0
8 0.0011 0.0417 0.0670 0
9 0.0003 0.0381 0.0714 0
50 0.0025 0.0790 0.1326 0
51 0.0022 0.0792 0.1333 0
100 0.0030 0.0924 0.1458 0
101 0.0031 0.0924 0.1471 0
1000 0.0042 0.1086 0.1599 0
1001 0.0044 0.1078 0.1605 0
∞ 0.0044 0.1105 0.1608 0
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Table 10: The probability of suffering the reversal bias: m = 4 and k = 2
n S
M & Borda Plurality
& Bloc & Negative Plurality
2 0 0 0.0800
3 0 0 0.0277
4 0 0 0.0085
5 0 0 0.0254
6 0.0000 0 0.0466
7 0.0000 0 0.0325
8 0.0000 0 0.0271
9 0.0000 0 0.0374
50 0.0000 0 0.0656
51 0.0000 0 0.0653
100 0.0000 0 0.0759
101 0.0000 0 0.0750
1000 0.0000 0 0.0879
1001 0.0000 0 0.0872
∞ 0.0000 0 0.0889





Borda Plurality = Bloc
2 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0.0246 0
4 0 0 0.0492 0.0328
5 0 0 0.0513 0.0215
6 0 0.0009 0.0426 0.0163
7 0 0 0.0548 0.0380
8 0 0.0011 0.0670 0.0417
9 0 0.0003 0.0714 0.0381
50 0 0.0025 0.1326 0.0790
51 0 0.0022 0.1333 0.0792
100 0 0.0030 0.1458 0.0924
101 0 0.0031 0.1471 0.0924
1000 0 0.0042 0.1599 0.1086
1001 0 0.0044 0.1605 0.1078
∞ 0 0.0044 0.1608 0.1105
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Table 12: The probability of suffering the Condorcet loser paradox: m = 3 and k = 1
n
S = M Plurality Negative
& Borda = Bloc Plurality
2 0 0 0
3 0 0 0
4 0 0 0
5 0 0 0.0250
6 0 0 0
7 0 0.0160 0.0080
8 0 0 0.0100
9 0 0.0159 0.0222
50 0 0.0209 0.0245
51 0 0.0258 0.0287
100 0 0.0250 0.0276
101 0 0.0275 0.0300
1000 0 0.0291 0.0311
1001 0 0.0294 0.0313
∞ 0 0.0296 0.0315
Table 13: The probability of suffering the Condorcet loser paradox: m = 3 and k = 2
n
S & M Negative Plurality
Plurality
& Borda = Bloc
2 0 0 0
3 0 0 0
4 0 0 0
5 0 0 0.0250
6 0 0 0
7 0 0.0160 0.0080
8 0 0 0.0100
9 0 0.0159 0.0222
50 0 0.0209 0.0245
51 0 0.0258 0.0287
100 0 0.0250 0.0276
101 0 0.0275 0.0300
1000 0 0.0291 0.0311
1001 0 0.0294 0.0313
∞ 0 0.0296 0.0315
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Table 14: The probability of suffering the Condorcet loser paradox: m = 4 and k = 1




2 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0.0137 0
4 0 0 0 0
5 0 0.0078 0.0059 0
6 0.0000 0 0.0005 0
7 0 0.0081 0.0105 0
8 0.0000 0.0031 0.0052 0
9 0.0000 0.0090 0.0116 0
50 0.0002 0.0115 0.0154 0
51 0.0004 0.0165 0.0208 0
100 0.0004 0.0166 0.0194 0
101 0.0005 0.0194 0.0222 0
1000 0.0006 0.0221 0.0237 0
1001 0.0007 0.0224 0.0236 0
∞ 0.0007 0.0228 0.0240 0
Table 15: The probability of suffering the Condorcet loser paradox: m = 4 and k = 2




2 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0.0027 0.0027 0.0003 0
6 0.0000 0 0.0013 0.0013 0 0
7 0.0000 0 0.0026 0.0026 0.0005 0
8 0.0000 0 0.0003 0.0003 0 0
9 0.0000 0 0.0038 0.0038 0.0006 0
50 0.0000 0 0.0055 0.0051 0.0005 0.0000
51 0.0000 0 0.0068 0.0069 0.0012 0.0000
100 0.0000 0 0.0071 0.0070 0.0009 0.0000
101 0.0000 0 0.0078 0.0076 0.0013 0.0000
1000 0.0000 0 0.0089 0.0089 0.0014 0.0000
1001 0.0000 0 0.0090 0.0089 0.0015 0.0000
∞ 0.0000 0 0.0090 0.0090 0.0016 0.0000
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Table 16: The probability of suffering the Condorcet loser paradox: m = 4 and k = 3




2 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0.0137 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0.0059 0.0078 0
6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0 0
7 0.0000 0 0.0105 0.0081 0
8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0052 0.0031 0
9 0.0000 0.0000 0.0116 0.0090 0
50 0.0000 0.0002 0.0160 0.0116 0.0000
51 0.0000 0.0004 0.0202 0.0162 0.0000
100 0.0000 0.0003 0.0196 0.0160 0.0000
101 0.0000 0.0005 0.0221 0.0189 0.0000
1000 0.0000 0.0007 0.0233 0.0222 0.0000
1001 0.0000 0.0007 0.0235 0.0225 0.0000
∞ 0.0000 0.0007 0.0240 0.0228 0.0000
Table 17: The probability of suffering the leaving member paradox: m = 4 and k = 2




2 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0.0021 0 0 0 0 0.0055
5 0.0011 0 0.0033 0 0 0
6 0.0038 0.0000 0.0018 0.0002 0 0.0085
7 0.0020 0.0002 0.0008 0.0006 0 0.0252
8 0.0049 0.0000 0.0082 0.0008 0 0.0081
9 0.0035 0.0006 0.0060 0.0014 0 0.0253
50 0.0201 0.0032 0.0321 0.0058 0.0137 0.0485
51 0.0205 0.0041 0.0324 0.0059 0.0154 0.0512
100 0.0262 0.0051 0.0386 0.0073 0.0199 0.0612
101 0.0267 0.0060 0.0399 0.0076 0.0193 0.0605
1000 0.0338 0.0076 0.0480 0.0090 0.0278 0.0738
1001 0.0344 0.0082 0.0485 0.0090 0.0286 0.0756
∞ 0.0350 0.0084 0.0485 0.0094 0.0286 0.0757
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Table 18: The probability of resolute-agreement between S and M
n
m = 3 m = 4
k = 1 k = 2 k = 1 k = 2 k = 3
2 1 0.1429 1 0.0800 0.0400
3 1 0.3214 1 0.1846 0.2615
4 1 0.2857 1 0.1593 0.1730
5 1 0.4286 1 0.2794 0.3206
6 1 0.3766 1 0.1806 0.2305
7 1 0.4848 1 0.2840 0.3502
8 1 0.4336 1 0.2197 0.2766
9 1 0.5215 1 0.3146 0.3749
50 1 0.6346 1 0.4908 0.4900
51 1 0.6524 1 0.5168 0.5193
100 1 0.6603 1 0.5442 0.5355
101 1 0.6694 1 0.5603 0.5517
1000 1 0.6847 1 0.5983 0.5807
1001 1 0.6856 1 0.6045 0.5832
∞ 1 0.6875 1 0.6074 0.5866
Table 19: The probability of resolute-agreement between S and the Borda csr
n
m = 3 m = 4
k = 1 k = 2 k = 1 k = 2 k = 3
2 0.4286 0.4286 0.2800 0.3600 0.2400
3 0.8571 0.3214 0.7631 0.2123 0.3077
4 0.6190 0.5238 0.4561 0.4075 0.3651
5 0.8333 0.4762 0.7287 0.3509 0.4120
6 0.6883 0.5762 0.4793 0.4147 0.4362
7 0.8409 0.5530 0.6944 0.3749 0.4607
8 0.7273 0.6107 0.5286 0.4323 0.4789
9 0.8452 0.5964 0.6999 0.4198 0.4937
50 0.8624 0.7528 0.7523 0.6344 0.6526
51 0.8812 0.7522 0.7861 0.6348 0.6554
100 0.8787 0.7716 0.7908 0.6706 0.6866
101 0.8880 0.7714 0.8055 0.6753 0.6887
1000 0.8941 0.7896 0.8253 0.7118 0.7199
1001 0.8950 0.7896 0.8245 0.7146 0.7228
∞ 0.8958 0.7917 0.8272 0.7168 0.7262
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Table 20: The probability of resolute-agreement between M and the Borda csr
n
m = 3 m = 4
k = 1 & k = 2 k = 1 k = 2 k = 3
2 0.4286 0.2800 0.1333 0.2800
3 0.8571 0.7631 0.4800 0.7631
4 0.6190 0.4561 0.2525 0.4561
5 0.8333 0.7287 0.4453 0.7287
6 0.6883 0.4793 0.3835 0.4756
7 0.8409 0.6944 0.6009 0.6944
8 0.7273 0.5286 0.4333 0.5266
9 0.8452 0.6999 0.6073 0.7004
50 0.8624 0.7523 0.7031 0.7500
51 0.8812 0.7861 0.7337 0.7858
100 0.8787 0.7908 0.7459 0.7886
101 0.8880 0.8055 0.7663 0.8057
1000 0.8941 0.8253 0.7865 0.8237
1001 0.8950 0.8245 0.7909 0.8256
∞ 0.8958 0.8272 0.7945 0.8288
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